Institutions As Rules and Resources: Explaining Cross-National Divergence in Call Centre Employment Systems

A large body of research in call centres has identified common trends of intensifying performance management, narrowed worker discretion, and declining job quality (e.g. Bain and Taylor 2000; Callaghan and Thompson 2001; Ellis and Taylor 2006; Russell 2009; Sewell et al. 2012). At the same time, comparative research shows surprisingly large cross-national differences in the extent of work intensification and invasive monitoring practices across similar call centre workplaces (Batt et al. 2009; Sorensen and Weinkopf 2009; Lloyd et al. 2010; Doellgast 2012; Holman 2013). These studies have generated (and sought to test) a number of hypotheses concerning different institutions that shape management practices – including participation rights, encompassing collective bargaining, employment protections, and “employment regimes”. However, the mechanisms through which institutional resources or constraints translate into alternative “employment systems” in these easily rationalized service jobs are still poorly understood. 

In this article, we compare differences in the employment systems that incumbent telecommunications firms in Denmark, France, Germany, Poland, and the UK adopted for their retail call centers in the late 2000s and early 2010s, with a focus on performance management practices. Findings are based on 140 interviews with management, union, and works council representatives at the five case study firms and at national level, as well as site visits at call centres at each company.

Case study findings show systematic differences in the tools and strategies unions and works councils used to influence performance management practices at each firm. We identify two distinct mechanisms. The first mode of influence was via rules that closed off alternative management practices. These included strong legislated or negotiated job security (very strong in France and Germany; moderate in the UK and Poland) and negotiated rules prohibiting individual performance based pay outside of sales-based outcomes (France and the UK) or remote monitoring of individuals (Germany). A second mode of influence was via participation resources that labour could use to establish procedures that improved the transparency and perceived fairness of performance management practices. These were most evident in Germany and Denmark, where local representatives established joint committees providing regular oversight and appeals processes for procedures and use of performance management data.

While both modes of influence helped to improve job quality to some extent by limiting managerial unilateralism, we argue that worker outcomes were best where worker representatives were able to draw on both sets of institutional ‘rules’ and ‘resources’. The German case demonstrates the best outcomes in this regard due to the combination of strong job security, legal participation rights, and partnership structures. Findings have implications for debates on the relationship between national institutions, human resource management practices, and worker outcomes in easily rationalized service sector jobs.