The Political Institution and its Civil Servants : A French Case

Talking about servants and owners seems to be a predictable topic belonging to historians. Aside from the number of papers and books on slavery, the literature on contemporary domesticity is increasing. This describes the phenomenon of international networks where the poorest countries export “servants” to the wealthiest. Finally, most of these works show that domesticity is far from disappearing, and criticise the immorality of such relations of domination between humans and states.

This market of “servants” confirms that at the individual scale, the model of servants and owners continues. However, because it is considered morally condemnable and lacks regulation, this domesticity is taboo. Nonetheless, despite being morally condemnable, it remains accepted, even in the places we do not expect it.

The case of the French National Assembly is a surprising example of the maintenance of this domesticity, at the institutional scale. The work of civil servants working for MPs is regulated, as is true for all civil servants of the state. However, they are an exception in that they have their own status specific to the National Assembly: the role is famous for being particularly privileged. Despite this privilege, the lowest civil servants of the hierarchy suffer from the simple tasks they are ordered to do. Nowadays, most of them are university graduates who experience a sense of disillusion once they are in the Assembly, and carrying out tasks, which do not use their competences. While the over-qualification on the market of work is well known, the idiosyncrasy is that here, they are very well-paid, earning far more than other executive workers doing the same tasks elsewhere, and even than civil servants of the state.

Thus, this communication suggests developing this translation of domesticity from an individual scale to an institutional one. The National Assembly, called the “house” by all the people working there, is still founded on the reproduction of old regulations of relationships. The owners are the MPs, and the servants are the civil servants. The current presentation, which arises from an ongoing PhD research, will focus on the relationships between the MPs, the institution’s direction, and the lowest civil servants of the hierarchy, involved in executive tasks. If the National Assembly can be seen as a big house of domesticity, the economic relationships are different from its traditional shapes; the servants are not paid by the people they serve, but by the institution. That may be one of the factors making this work morally acceptable because protected by a status.

Starting from the metaphor of the “gilded cage” often used by civil servants to qualify the Assembly, this communication will question the role of money in the relationships between the MPs, their servants, and this institution. How does it place value on and justify the work and status of its civil servants? What is the role of money in this particular case?

The presentation will be partly based on the beginnings of an ethnography in the Assembly, and partly on the analysis of materials from the institution.