Continuity Agents, Institutionally-Embedded Political Conflicts, and the Contingent Evolvement of Gradual Change Processes: Evidence from "Jammed" Welfare State Reforms in Israel
Bringing continuity agents to the fore implies that gradual change processes, such as layering and conversion, are likely to be contested, and hence will not necessarily have transformative results. We suggest that the specific outcomes of these modes of change and the paths they may take, largely depend on the ability of each of the competing sides to utilize prevailing institutional arrangements, recruit the support of other political agents and build with them coalitions. Consequently, gradual change may be stalled or reversed, and need not necessarily generate full-blown institutional transformations.
We demonstrate the analytical power of this theorization by empirically analyzing two case studies of welfare reforms in Israel. These reforms, which were initiated and gradually implemented by the Israeli Ministry of Finance and its collaborators, have never fully materialized. One reform was stalled and the other was fully reversed. By process-tracing both cases we reveal the role played by institutionally-embedded political struggles – between change and continuity agents – in shaping the path that each of these reforms has taken.