After Dodd-Frank: Advocacy Groups and Pathways of Institutional Change in Financial Market Regulation
This paper extends the analysis of advocacy groups in the politics of finance. It asks whether these groups can achieve more than incremental change in the rule-making process for financial markets. Using the literature on institutional change, the paper examines the impediments and the potential for lasting transformation in the institutions for systemic regulation of financial markets. Empirical material is drawn primarily from the United States, but with compative reference to European cases.
Selected References
Carpenter, Daniel, and David A. Moss, eds., Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
Dobbin, Frank, and Jiwook Jung, “The Misapplication of Mr. Michael Jensen: How Agency Theory Brought Down the Economy and Why It Might Again,” in Markets on Trial: The Economic Sociology of the U.S. Financial Crisis: Part B, Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 30B (2010): 29-64.
Trumbull, J. Gunnar, Strength in Numbers: The Political Power of Weak Interests (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).
Ziegler, J. Nicholas, and John T. Woolley, “After Dodd-Frank: Ideas asnd the Post-Enactment Politics of Financial Reform in the United States,” forthcoming, Politics and Society (2016).