The Quantification of Decency
Since the 1980s, the Prison Service of England and Wales has undertaken a series of steps to transform prisons into performance-oriented accounting entities. Apart from prison privatization, instruments of cost accounting, prison rating and performance measurement played a crucial role in this process. My paper gives insight into the development of prison performance measures and ratings from 1992, when the first performance measures were introduced, to 2015. I investigate their intertwinement with prison privatization and their effect on prison value reconfigurations. In the Prison Service of England and Wales, formalized performance measurement systems were, on the one hand, introduced to bring the economy of prison management to the fore, seeking to focus prison governors’ attention on issues of cost management and efficient process management. The reforms were based on a conception of accountability that reflected high trust in the market and private business methods, and low trust in public servants and professionals. On the other hand, the measures were enrolled in attempts to ensure value plurality and “to moralize” prison management by including measures of decency and dignity alongside measures of public security, operational effectiveness and cost.
My paper queries the extent to which quantification can be called upon as a mediating instrument where values are at stake. According to Espeland and Stevens, one virtue of quantification is “that it offers standardized ways of constructing proxies for uncertain and elusive qualities” (Espeland & Stevens, 1998: 316). Another virtue is that it is “useful for representing value” (ibid.). In a similar vein, Miller (1992: 61) has emphasized the “transformative capacity” of performance numbers, arguing that “the neutrality and social authority accorded to the single figure is one that is set above the fray, apart from disputes and political interests, and endowed with a legitimacy that seems difficult to contest or dispute”. As Espeland and Stevens have highlighted, quantification can offer “a rigorous method for democratizing decisions and sharing power”, particularly in situations “characterized by disparate values, diverse forms of knowledge, and the wish to incorporate people’s preferences” (Espeland & Stevens, 1998: 330). This raises the question of the extent to which accounting, and quantification more generally, can be called upon as a “moralizing” and “democratizing” instrument (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Fourcade & Healy, 2007; Hirschman, 1982; Lamont, 2012). It also raises the question of the extent to which quantification can play the role of a “mediating instrument” (Miller & O'Leary, 2007; Morrison & Morgan, 1999; Wise, 1988) where disparate values and rationalities, such as those of security, decency and economy, are at stake.
Objects and subjects of performance management, once standardized through accounting, are accorded a particular type of visibility, and this creates distinctive possibilities for intervention while potentially displacing others. Performance measurement instruments can easily lead to a narrowing of accountability and the crowding out of particular values (e.g. rehabilitation). But equally we should not be too quick in dismissing the potential that performance metrics have for animating reflection, debate and reform, not least because of the public attention and criticism they can attract. Instruments of quantification, including systems of prison rating and performance measurement, are both inherently administrative and political. This paper seeks to contribute to the unfolding of the complex interplay between quantification and regulatory change by attending to the multi-faceted modalities and operations of prison performance measures – from flawed tool of representation, learning device, to powerful ammunition machine – and the conditions under which these different modalities unfold.
Empirically, I pay particular attention to attempts aimed at the quantification of decency in prison. I examine the Prison Service’s “decency agenda”, emerging from 1999 onwards, against the background of processes of privatization, actuarialization and managerialization. I trace attempts aimed at the development of “quantitative measures of qualitative dimensions of prison life” (Liebling, 2004) and I scrutinize how these contribute (or not) to the transformation of the objects of prison regulation and accountability, with particular attention to objects that are also subjects. Finally, I explore more general implications for our understanding of the relationship between economy and morality and the role of quantification in its mediation.
Methodologically, the paper is based on the study of media and parliamentary data, government reports (including White Papers), reports by the HM Prison Service, the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), National Audit Office (NAO) and HM Inspectorate of Prisons, research published by academics and practitioners, and reports published by interest groups seeking to improve prison conditions (see e.g. the Prison Reform Trust and the Howard League for Penal Reform). In addition, the paper will draw on interview data gathered from those actors involved in the development, implementation and enactment of prison ratings and performance measures, including prison governors, representatives of the National Offender Management Service, risk managers, criminologists, social workers, prison inspectors, auditors, accountants and representatives of prison interest groups.