Collective Bargaining at the Establishment Level in Québec: Balanced or Asymmetrical Flexibility and Security Outcomes?

The decentralized negotiation of working conditions is a fact for the vast majority of Québec’s unionized private sector workplaces because, it is now built into the autonomous industrial relations system of this Canadian province created more than 70 years ago, but also because almost all of the rare experiences of sectoral or multi-employer bargaining collapsed before the end of the 20^th century under the pressures of globalization (Laroche 2009). The fundamentals of the system were deeply influenced by the US Wagner Act model, characterized by collective bargaining and recognition at the establishment level, the parties’ freedom to bargain, and so forth. In spite of the features that Québec’s industrial relations system shares with the US system, the Canadian federal system and the various systems adopted by other provinces, it is often considered the exception in North-America due to some of its distinct characteristics: labor law provisions seen as pro-union (such as the prohibition against using strikebreakers, first contract arbitration, compulsory union dues check-off or card check certification), the possible – albeit limited – extension of negotiated working conditions, tripartite concertation, relatively well-developed labor standards, etc. Over the years, this system has contributed to the stability of union presence in Québec, which, while unevenly distributed across sectors, is nevertheless higher (around 40%) than in any other North American jurisdiction. The distinctiveness of Québec’s industrial relations system, with its long-standing tradition of decentralized collective bargaining and the relative vigor of the union movement, makes this system a rich case for studying how local parties deal exclusively at the establishment level with contemporary pressures and attempt to achieve balanced outcomes.

Such a decentralized bargaining structure makes it easier to adapt the agreement more closely to the needs and constraints of the local parties but also leads to greater heterogeneity of working conditions depending on the local power balance (Jalette & Laroche 2010). Marginson and Galetto’s (2016) cross-national study of the metalworking sector in European countries showed that the institutional arrangements governing bargaining influence the latter’s capacity to address flexibility and security. For instance, single-employer bargaining is expected to generate a more advantageous balance for employers between flexibility-enhancing measures and security commitments.  In Québec, Jalette and Laroche (2010) observed that, between the late 1980s and just prior to the financial crisis, the content of collective agreements evolved significantly towards greater flexibility for the employer and new rights for employees. They concluded that this evolution demonstrated the capacity of collective agreements to adjust to contemporary challenges, such as increased competition and work-life balance. Nevertheless, Laroche (2013) raised the question as to whether both sides benefited equally from this adaptation.

Based on government data on various collective agreement provisions and industrial relations dynamics and a review of the relevant research, this paper examines recent developments in the outcomes of Québec’s industrial relations system. More specifically, we examine how the content of collective agreements has evolved since the financial crisis and test the assumption of unbalanced flexibility and security outcomes favoring employers at the expense of workers.