All the Evidence the European Commission Needs to Divide-and-Conquer? Impact Assessments and EU Ports Policy Making

The greater use of impact assessments (IAs) has been one of the most important innovations in European governance over the last decade (Bozzini and Smismans, 2016) whereby the European Commission undertakes an ex ante assessment of the economic, social and environmental impact of all legislative and major policy proposals. IAs are intended to collate evidence, ensure policy coordination, establish input-legitimacy, achieve meta-political objectives (e.g. reducing the ‘regulatory burden’) and maintain political control (e.g. respecting the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality) (ibid; and Rowe, 2006). The goal of collecting (neutral) evidence requires the involvement of working and expert groups while pursuing input legitimacy demands the involvement of a large or at least representative number of stakeholders, but the Commission tends to prioritise coordination of its own activities and resources over expert evidence and input legitimacy (Bozzini and Smismans, 2016; Turpenny et al, 2009), often to the detriment of (organised) labour and local communities.

Of particular concern is the (ab)use of IAs to (mis)inform the ‘rhetorical framing’ of EU policy proposals. As the guardian of the Treaty and EU competition law, the Commission is more than just an ‘agenda setter’, promoting market access and the freedom to provide services (aka. liberalisation) either through a strategy of ‘divide-and-conquer’ (i.e. targeting firms and/or Member States who try to ‘cheat the market’) or encouraging Member States to reach a compromise ‘lesser evil’ position than the ‘open market’ promoted by the supranational state (Schmidt, 2000; and Woll, 2006). Whereas the latter (lesser evil) strategy has failed to open the port transport market (Turnbull, 2010a), largely as a result of organised opposition by dockworkers (Turnbull, 2006) and other stakeholders (Turnbull, 2010b), the latest strategy of the Commission (DG Move) involves framing the debate on EU ports policy to ‘divide-and-conquer’ (Thomas and Turnbull, 2015). An impact assessment of the economic effects of different European port polices, undertaken by PriceWaterhouseCoopers/Panteia for the Commission (CEC, 2013), and a very detailed (socio-legal) study of the ‘myriad restrictions’ of dockland labour markets in all maritime Member States (Van Hooydonk, 2013), provided the ammunition for the latest assault on port labour in the targeted Member States.

In this paper we review the role of IAs as a new form of EU governance and present a detailed case study of EU ports policy and the role of impact assessments in the rhetorical framing and subsequent infringement procedures against Member States (specifically Spain and Belgium) as the Commission tries, once more, to open the market for port services. Data is based on ethnographic and action research with the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF) and several national transport union, as well as in-depth interviews with port employers, public port authorities, shipping lines, and Commission officials.

 

 

References

Bozzini, E. and Smismans, S. (2016) ‘More inclusive European governance through impact assessments?’ Comparative European Politics, 14: 89-106.

CEC (2013b) Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Framework on Market Access to Port Services and Financial Transparency of Ports, SWD(2013) 181 final, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities.

Rowe, G.C. (2006) ‘Tools for the control of political and administrative agents: impact assessment and administrative governance in the European Union’, in H.C.H. Hofmann and A.H. Turk (eds.) EU Administrative Governance, Edward Elgard, pp.448-511.

Schmidt, S. (2000) ‘Only an agenda setter? The European Commission’s power over the Council of Ministers’, European Union Politics, 1(1): 37-61.

Thomas, R. and Turnbull, P. (2015) ‘Talking up a storm? Using language to activate adherents and demobilise detractors of European Commission policy frames’, mimeo, Cardiff Business School.

Turnbull, P. (2006) ‘The war on Europe’s waterfront – repertoires of power in the port transport industry’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 44(2): 305-26.

Turnbull, P. (2010a) ‘Creating markets, contesting markets: labour internationalism and the European Common Transport Policy’, in S. McGrath-Champ, A. Herod and A. Rainnie (eds.) Handbook of Employment and Society: Working Space, Edward Elgar, pp.35-52.

Turnbull, P. (2010b) ‘From social conflict to social dialogue: counter-mobilisation on the European waterfront’, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 16(4): 333-49.

Turnpenny, J., Radaelli, C.M., Jordan, A. and Jacob, K. (2009) ‘The policy and politics of policy appraisal: emerging trends and new directions’, Journal of European Public Policy, 16(4): 640-53.

Van Hooydonk, E. (2013) Port Labour in the EU: Labour Market Qualifications and Training and Health and Safety, Volume 1 – The EU Perspective, Study commissioned by the European Commission, DG Move/C2/2010-81/S12.588013, PORTIUS.

Woll, C. (2006) ‘The road to external representation: the European Commission’s activism in international air transport’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13(1): 52-69.